

# Recent Trends in Global neo-Jihadi Terrorism in the West and the Turn to Political Violence


Marc Sageman

Sageman Consulting, LLC

The tenth anniversary of the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, provides an opportunity to pause and reflect on the evolution of the global neo-jihadi terrorist threat to the West and its implications for our understanding of political violence. This threat is defined as the use of violence by non-state collective actors against non-combatants in the West in pursuit of a global neo-jihad. Although this form of terrorism is not jihad according to traditional meaning of jihad, the perpetrators claim it is jihad, hence the expression of global neo-jihad.

## Recent Trends in Global neo-Jihadi Terrorism in the West

To understand the evolution of a phenomenon, one must look at the trend over time, which in this case means doing a comprehensive survey of all global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West over time. To be included in the survey, a plot must have involved some acts in furtherance, such as buying material for weapon production. Just talk about carrying out such attacks would not have reached the threshold required for inclusion in this survey. Sting operations by law enforcement authorities were excluded since it is not clear whether potential terrorists, by themselves, would have gone to the conclusion of their conspiracy.




In the decade after 9/11/01, there have been 63 plots in the West conducted in the name of al Qaeda.<sup>1</sup> They include about 210 people directly involved in the potential violence, giving an incidence base rate of three terrorists per one hundred million people per year. This very low base rate presents considerable challenges to law enforcement authorities trying to detect terrorists because it ensures that terrorists are hidden in a sea of false alarms, no matter how good the detection capabilities may be.<sup>2</sup>

Although it does not provide much detail at this point, the shape of the first graph shows a sharp increase in the number of plots in 2004, where it reached the high water mark of 10 plots, a gradual decrease over the next four years and another gradual increase starting 2008. This is suggestive of two processes at work, one that showed its potency in 2004 at the high water mark of 10 plots and a second more insidious one that started around 2009. In order to analyze this threat further, the graph must be broken down according to plots directly traced back to al Qaeda itself, those traced back to other allied terrorist organizations, and those without direct connection to formal global neo-jihadi terrorist groups, but inspired by them.

### **Al Qaeda Plots in the West since 9/11/01**

How big of a threat is al Qaeda? In other words, how many were true al Qaeda plots, namely conducted by people who were trained, encouraged and sometimes financed by al Qaeda?



Here we see that since September 11, 2001, there have been only fifteen plots in the West attributable to al Qaeda proper. The graph clearly shows three clusters of attacks. The first one, in 2001, were attacks carried out in parallel to the September 11, 2001 attack: the plot against the

U.S. Embassy in Paris, another one against the Kleine Brogel U.S. Air Base in Belgium, and the shoe bomb airplane attack. These plots and the 9/11/01 attack appeared to be part of a larger campaign of attacks orchestrated and funded by al Qaeda against the West. Then there is a gap of two and a half years, during which al Qaeda seemed unable to project any attack against the West.

The second cluster specifically targeted Britain: the fertilizer bomb plot of March 2004; the gas limousine project; the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London transportation system; the July 21, 2005 bombing attempt against the same target; and finally the trans-Atlantic airplanes liquid bomb plot of August 2006. Let us dig a bit deeper to understand the pattern of these plots.

From the trial transcripts, the plot of March 2004 seems to have been completely initiated and carried out by a bunch of guys from Crawley, England, who went to Pakistan hoping to join the fight against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. However, they were turned down by al Qaeda and encouraged to continue providing logistic support for the resistance in Afghanistan. The Crawley boys instead decided to return to Britain to carry out an operation there. They bought half a ton of fertilizer to build a bomb, but the plot seems to have fizzled out when they were later given the green light to come and fight in Afghanistan. In this plot, the perpetrators were not under the command and control of al Qaeda, but simply notified it of their intension.<sup>3</sup> But the perpetrators' attempt to carry out an attack in the West put this alternative into the repertoire of possibilities for young militant Muslims trying to join the fight against the West.

The gas limousine project was a plot to blow up three limousines packed with gas cylinders and explosives near or under target buildings in Britain. The plot was led by Dhiren Barot, a long time al Qaeda operative, who shared his plan with al Qaeda and recruited seven of his friends to participate in the conspiracy. Although the planning was at a relatively advanced stage, Barot neither obtained any funding for the project, nor acquired any vehicle or bomb-making material. Barot and his accomplices were arrested in August 2004, when his plans were discovered in an al Qaeda computer in Pakistan. Barot might be considered to be an al Qaeda sleeper, but his delay in taking any action for almost three years is puzzling, especially in view of the fact that the vast majority of global neo-jihadi terrorist attacks in the West by terrorist trained perpetrators took place within six months of the perpetrators' return to the West from training abroad.

The last three plots in this cluster followed the same pattern. Young Muslim British citizens of immigrant origin, who had joined the Islamist political protest social movement in England, went to Pakistan to join the fight in the West. There, they met with an al Qaeda intermediary, Rashid Rauf, a fugitive from Birmingham, England, who introduced them to al Qaeda's chief of external operations, Abu Ubaydah al-Masri. Al-Masri arranged for the training of the leaders of these respective plots and convinced them to return to England to carry out operations there. The seven plotters accepted al Qaeda command and control and recruited some of their friends upon their return. The results were the successful 7/7/05 bombings of the London transportation system, the

near miss of a repeat operation against the same target two weeks later, and the arrests of the Operation Overt suspects in August 2006.<sup>4</sup>

Although these five plots took place in England, there is no evidence of any al Qaeda infrastructure in the West. The perpetrators were all “homegrown”, meaning that they were local volunteers, who were raised and radicalized in the West and went to Pakistan to seek al Qaeda to help them. They provided the initiative and the driving force of these plots. In Pakistan, they met Rashid Rauf, probably through their extensive contacts in the global Islamist social movement, and returned to Britain to execute their attacks. There was no indoctrination, “recruitment” or any “brainwashing” in the traditional sense: al Qaeda was totally dependent on these homegrown volunteers coming to Pakistan and simply invited them to initiate terrorist plots in the West.

The next al Qaeda plot took place in Denmark. The leader of the plot, Hamad Khurshid, had been born in Denmark, but moved back to Pakistan as an infant. As an adolescent, he returned to Denmark for a short time, but returned to Pakistan, where he became radicalized and joined al Qaeda. He returned to Denmark in 2007 specifically to carry out a bombing attempt. He recruited his roommate for the plot, but was arrested in September 2007 after he manufactured the detonator. This plot was the first al Qaeda infiltration to the West using a militant who had a Western passport because of his birth there.

The last cluster of al Qaeda plots include three that were connected through the same email contact in Peshawar, under the code name “Ahmad.”<sup>5</sup> The three plots were the Manchester Plot led by Abid Naseer, disrupted in April 2009; the New York City subway attack, led by Najibullah Zazi, disrupted in September 2009; and the Oslo plot against Chinese targets there, led by Mikael Davud, disrupted in July 2010.<sup>6</sup> Rashid Rauf, who had been arrested in August 2006 in connection with Operation Overt case but escaped in December 2007, was also the intermediary with each of these plots. It is intriguing to speculate on the importance of these al Qaeda intermediaries in Pakistan as a bridge between al Qaeda and Western wannabes who come to Pakistan in search of al Qaeda but have trouble making the contact. As the graph shows, during Rauf’s imprisonment, al Qaeda operations in the West came to a halt – with the exception of Khurshid in Denmark. The killing of Rauf in November 2008 eliminated this vital link to Western volunteers. After his death, poor tradecraft by his successor – lack of compartmentalization by using the same email address for three different plots – allowed Western intelligence agencies to detect and disrupt these al Qaeda plots.

Interspersed among these plots was David Coleman Headley’s plot to kill Kurt Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist. Headley, a terrorist of fortune, was born in the U.S. but raised in Pakistan. He returned to the U.S., where he became a drug dealer. He was arrested and after serving a short sentence was sent to Pakistan by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency to penetrate Pakistani drug networks. Instead, he became a radical and joined Lashkar e-Toyba, for whom he went to Mumbai to conduct reconnaissance for the November 2008 attack there. Afterwards, he was tasked to kill Westergaard, but his original sponsors abandoned the project. Headley, looking for


a new sponsor, met with Ilyas Kashmiri, who had joined al Qaeda and approved the project. Headley was arrested in October 2009 before completing his project.<sup>7</sup> After Headley's arrest, Kashmiri encouraged two militants, who had residence in Sweden, to conduct a Mumbai type of attack against the cartoonist and the Danish newspaper that had originally published the Muhammad cartoons. They invited some of their local friends to join in the plot, but were arrested in Copenhagen and Stockholm in late December 2010.<sup>8</sup>

The last al Qaeda plot in the West was the attempt to conduct an attack in Germany, which resulted in the April 2011 arrest of three militants, who had bought some bomb making material. The leader was allegedly in communication with the leadership of al Qaeda in Pakistan.

In summary, there were fifteen al Qaeda plots in the West in the decade after 9/11/01. Only one attack was successful, the London transportation system bombing of 7/7/05. During this decade, only 21 people returned from an al Qaeda training camp. They had been homegrown militant wannabes, who had succeeded in linking up with an al Qaeda representative in Pakistan. Back home, they invited some of their friends to participate in a terrorist plot. There were really only three instances of al Qaeda infiltration of the West: Hamad Khurshid, David Headley and perhaps Abid Naseer. In other words, the 9/11/01 attack on the West was atypical, for it was a raid by outsiders onto the U.S. This attack shaped the way policy makers thought about the threat, to the neglect of the homegrown threat, which has been far more prominent since that attack.

### **Al Qaeda Affiliates' Plots in the West since 9/11/01**

The global neo-jihadi threat is not just al Qaeda, but includes plots by its terrorist allies.



The above graph shows eight plots in the West by al Qaeda affiliated groups since 9/11/01. There were two plots by al Tawhid wa'l Jihad, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's terrorist group before it changed its name to al Qaeda in Iraq; two plots by Tareek e-Taliban e-Pakistan (TTP); two plots by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); and one plot each by Lashkar e-Toyba (LeT) and by the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU). None of these plots was successful, but two came very close, as the explosives failed.

The Western invasion of Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 scattered not only al Qaeda but also other Islamist militant groups there. One, al Tawhid wa'l Jihad, was composed mostly of Jordanians, including its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Some of its members sought refuge in Germany, where they decided to conduct a series of bombings against Jewish targets and nightclubs. They were arrested in April 2002 before they were able to carry out these attacks. Two years later, sympathizers of this group tried to take advantage of the visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Alawi to assassinate him. The German police disrupted the plot in December 2004.

Other Islamist militant groups decided to go global and conduct attacks in the West. A plot to bomb some targets in Sydney Australia by Australian and French homegrown militants directed by Lashkar e-Toyba was disrupted in October 2003 by a collaborative Franco-Australian effort.<sup>9</sup> A splinter of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), decided to conduct attacks in the West to increase its profile. It stumbled upon some German Islamist militants looking to join the global neo-jihad, trained and funded them to return to Germany to conduct a series of bombings. This plot was disrupted in September 2007 by German authorities.

Meanwhile, in the Pakistani tribal areas, Pashtun elements opposed to the Pakistani government consolidated into an umbrella organization, the *Tareek e-Taliban e-Pakistan* (TTP). It launched a campaign of bombings in Pakistan and assassinated Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. It also decided to project its power to the West. It launched a plot to bomb the transportation system in Barcelona. The Spanish authorities disrupted the plot in January 2008.<sup>10</sup> A year and a half later, it launched an attack on New York. The perpetrator, Faisal Shahzad, had come to the U.S. in the late 1990s to study. He settled down, got married and became a naturalized citizen. He became radicalized in the U.S. and returned to his native Pakistan. Through some acquaintance, he met members of the TTP, which trained him and turned him around to conduct a series of bombings in the U.S. His first bomb in Times Square, New York, failed to explode and the investigation quickly led to his arrest in May 2010.

By the end of the decade since 9/11/01, the most aggressive terrorist group targeting the West was Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Since its creation in January 2009, it conducted two attacks on the West. On Christmas Day 2009, a young Nigerian, who had radicalized in London and went to Yemen to volunteer his services to Anwar al Awlaqi, tried to detonate a


bomb hidden in his underwear on a trans-Atlantic flight before landing in Detroit. In October 2010, AQAP sent two bombs hidden in parcels to explode as cargo over U.S. airspace.

In summary, only three of the al Qaeda allies' plots could be viewed as infiltration of the West, namely the two al Tawhid plots in Germany and AQAP's parcel bombs plot. The other five were homegrown as they were carried out by people who were radicalized in the West before going abroad in search of a terrorist organization. When combined with the al Qaeda plots, only six plots might be viewed as outside raids on the West. Of all the 63 global neo-jihadi terrorist plots against the West, 57 or over 90% were homegrown, without any link whatsoever to any outside terrorist organization. There is no evidence from these plots that al Qaeda or any of its allies ever recruited in the West, despite the repeated conventional wisdom to search for terrorist recruiters or masterminds in the West. There is also no evidence of any outside terrorist organization infrastructure in the West. In all these plots, the link with an outside terrorist organization occurred abroad, often in Pakistan or sometimes in Yemen or Syria, but never in the West.

### **Al Qaeda Inspired Plots in the West since 9/11/01**

The vast majority of global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West since 9/11/01, 40 out of 63 or 63%, were purely homegrown, inspired by al Qaeda, but not linked to it or its terrorist allies. Six of these plots were successful in terms of causing any innocent casualty: the Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004;<sup>11</sup> Mohammed Bouyeri's assassination of Theo van Gogh in 2004; Major Nidal Hasan's mass murders in Ft Hood, Texas, in 2009; Roshonara Chowdhry's stabbing of Member of Parliament Timms in 2010; Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly's wounding of two pedestrians in 2010; and Arid Uka's murder of two U.S. airmen in 2011. Except for the Madrid bombings, when the perpetrators were able to acquire dynamite, detonator cord and detonators, the other successful attacks were carried out with regular firearms or a knife. One of Taimour Abdulwahab's bombs detonated prematurely killing him and injuring two innocent pedestrians near-by. Several other plots had bombs that failed to detonate, emphasizing the point that the higher rate of success of these plots was due to their simplicity: using firearms or a knife. They were indeed quite amateurish when compared with the larger conspiracies of past global neo-jihadi terrorist plots, but also more effective.

## Al Qaeda Inspired Plots in the West since 9/11/01



Given the weight of numbers, the shape of the homegrown plots graph provides the general shape to the overall graph of all attacks. It appears that there are two processes going on. The first process, lasting from 2002 to 2007, is characterized by small groups of homegrown terrorists trying to carry out operations in their home country. This process received some stimulus around 2003-2004, which propelled the number of plots to its high water mark in 2004 and has decayed ever since. The second process seems to have started more gradually in 2008 and is characterized by lone wolves, people acting on their own without eliciting any physical help from anyone else. In the last four years of the decade since 9/11/01, 11 of 16 plots were carried out by loners and three more were duos. Therefore, very small groups of one or two perpetrators constituted 88% of all homegrown global neo-jihadi plots against the West. To anticipate the argument in the next session, the first process is a result of moral outrage to the invasion of Iraq, while the second is the result of social media on the Internet.



The rise of homegrown lone wolf global neo-jihadi terrorists provides strong support for the argument that the threat to the West is evolving into a Leaderless Jihad, as the process of radicalization in an increasingly physically hostile environment, but enable by the Internet, resulted in a more scattered and disconnected network of perpetrators.<sup>12</sup> Of course, the threat from large terrorist organizations like al Qaeda is still present, but it is receding in importance to the homegrown lone wolves.

If the global neo-jihadi terrorist threat is mostly homegrown rather than coming from abroad, what is the process of turning to political violence at home?

### **The Turn to Political Violence**

The realization that terrorism, like politics, is mostly local and that most terrorists are homegrown rather than imported from abroad has led to an interest in the process of radicalization. However, the use of this term obfuscates our understanding of this process because it has two meanings, which are used interchangeably resulting in hopeless confusion. One meaning is the acquisition of extreme ideas while the other is the actual turn to political violence. The confusion of these two meanings implies that if people publicly espouse political violence, they are violent – that is, they do what they say.<sup>13</sup> Ten years of counter-terrorism practice has taught us that thousands of young people boast or brag about being *mujahedin*<sup>14</sup> especially on the Internet, but very few go on to commit any act in furtherance of violence. Law enforcement officers in the West are very concerned about how to distinguish those who talk from those who act. In Western liberal democracies, freedom of expression compounds the confusion about radicalization: violent talk without violence is not a prosecutable offense, although some liberal democracies are trying to make the advocacy of violence a crime by itself. Nevertheless, for most Western countries, the airing of grievances with an extreme vocabulary is not a crime.

How do people acquire extreme beliefs and turn to political violence? This section will present a model of the turn to political violence in Western liberal democracies. It is based on two sets of data: trial transcripts of recent global neo-jihadi terrorist trials<sup>15</sup> and careful analysis of previous waves of terrorism based on primary source material.<sup>16</sup> Once the concept of radicalization is disaggregated into two concepts, it is clear that the turn to political violence emerges out of a specific context, a political protest social movement. This context gives meaning to the violence; otherwise, the perpetrators are simply mass murderers. The path to political violence is therefore a two-step process: first joining a political protest social movement and then turning to violence itself – often rejecting the protest community as ineffective.

The political protest social movement is foremost a discursive community of meaning, anchored by specific symbols and rituals, which become a lifestyle for its participants. The symbols include a specific dress code and appearance, and the rituals involve deep concern for purity of practice. The vocabulary of this protest counter-culture is peppered with ritualistic expressions

taken from revered texts and models of living. These symbols and expressions give the participants in this social movement the appearance of commitment to the overall guiding ideas of the movement. In the global neo-jihadi social movement, participants use symbols and expressions that give them the appearance of being religious. This apparent religiosity is often paper thin as most participants have turned to religion relatively late in life, often because of joining this social movement for political rather than religious reasons. These symbols and rituals amount to a lifestyle, which participants view as 'cool.' Thus, they create a 'jihad cool' counter-culture, which resonates with their political, economic and personal grievances.

The common ideas of this counter-culture are: being Muslim is an important part of a participant's life; the West is at best hostile and at worst at war against Muslims through both discrimination at home and especially persecution abroad; and it is important for participants to try to end this injustice. It is therefore important for members to be politically active, as collective action is critical to ending these injustices and can succeed. Political activism is the second major characteristic of this protest social movement, and this activism minimally includes political discussions, face to face or on the Internet. Activism can of course escalate to participation in demonstrations, attending political lectures, financial support of Muslim humanitarian organizations, proselytism for the cause, and more intense participation in Internet discussion groups and social media.

The structure and dynamics of these political protest social movements are difficult to capture because of their vague, porous and fuzzy boundaries; it is not always clear who is a participant and who is not. Most young people just flirt with political activism and participate only when world events inspire them to join a demonstration or express themselves on the Internet. This leads to wide fluctuations in the size of the protest community; with relatively few dedicated enough to provide the backbone of the social movement. Original participation is often through friendship and kinship networks and grows according to the form of participation, whether it is a physical protest demonstration against some Western foreign intervention or simply chatting on the Internet. In the course of participating, the social network of the protesters expands dramatically. Within the fuzzy community, participants meet others, often through chance encounters, thus interacting with different groups within the community. This fuzziness and fluidity cannot be captured in a meaningful way through formal social network analysis. Such an analysis is too static and not nuanced enough to capture the ephemeral interactions of participants either at large political demonstrations or at smaller and evanescent political discussions. The internal dynamics of participants approximates human Brownian motion. This loose amorphous collection of people, who participate intermittently, has no central command and control. There are many people who claim to speak for and represent this social movement, but these are just claims, often amplified by local media that focus on some of the more outrageous and sensational self-promoters. In fact, these claimants have no power to discipline the loose community, which is strained by intense internal competition among various organizations that try to lead it. This political protest social movement is therefore multi-

cephalic, with no organization able to control and discipline the community. One might best capture the lack of formal structure and the fluid internal dynamics of this amorphous collection of people with the metaphor of a social blob rather than a more formal network or organization.

This social blob does not emerge by itself. It is created through the intense efforts of local political entrepreneurs, who organize political protests. As various demonstrations repeat themselves, the continuity transforms a mob into a blob. Indeed, the geographical distribution of local blobs reflects the original more or less random distribution of these political entrepreneurs. However, the blobs are in a perpetual state of flux as their membership constantly changes and outlive their creators, who pass on their action frames to new opinion leaders that bring in their own perspectives influenced by the latest social trends. While most political participants are intermittently mobilized in protest of events that elicit moral outrage, a minority escalate the intensity of their participation. First, there might be an invitation to a political rally or meeting extended by friends or kin. Some participants spend more time with activists, and in time adopt the new friends' symbols and rituals, which become a lifestyle. This activism escalates from demonstration to writing petitions, to financial support for humanitarian organizations, to support in solidarity with 'political prisoners' – members of the social blob who have previously been arrested by authorities. Full blob participants often engage in proselytism and some join full time, very demanding organizations that are dedicated to recruitment and political change. Similar processes occur online, where Internet chat rooms are created, giving voice to political protest. Up to this point, blob activities, now often labeled as violent extremism by state authorities and their supporters, are still legal and legitimate in Western liberal democracies.

Physical (as opposed to online) social blobs are characterized by local homogeneity – local student or religious study groups or local street gangs – and global heterogeneity, when all these local groups are pooled together and lose their distinguishing local character. Group dynamics influence social blobs, with common activism forging increased commitment. Each local group acts as an echo chamber, encouraging mutual escalation of participation, which activates their common identity – a pan-Islamic one in this global neo-jihadi social movement – and increases their loyalty to each other. With time, this loyalty makes them ready to sacrifice themselves for comrade and the cause, according to the script and role models prevalent in their political protest counterculture.

This analysis of social blobs is complicated by the gradual shift to online social blobs, such as 'jihadi chat rooms' or even less formal social media groups, which eliminate temporal and geographical limits of offline social blobs. The hostile physical environment in the West, where law enforcement agencies are aggressively monitoring social blob activities, partially dictated this migration to the Internet. The Internet has allowed the social blob to survive because of its built-in redundancy and semi-anonymity that partially protects blob members. This move to online activities is also transforming the social blob: teenagers, women and "geeks" have become more prominent in this virtual blob. The structural egalitarianism of the Internet has insured that no discipline can be imposed from above on online participants. Leaders have the opportunity to

make suggestions, but the real initiative has shifted to followers, who decide for themselves what they are willing to do. Nevertheless, the Internet now links these small widely scattered offline local groups and the much larger online forums and social media networks, creating a virtual social movement. The vision and guidance of this global social blob do come from surviving Arabic websites that comprise the *al-Fajr* network, but their offline manifestations come from their translation, interpretation and understanding emerging out of group discussion in local vernacular chat rooms and social media chats. The resulting local calls to redress the global injustice directed at them attract young disgruntled Muslims, and their resulting activism provides new meaning to their lives.

So far, the model has dealt only with the first step to political violence, which is still legal and legitimate in Western liberal democracy. The second step crosses this line of legality and moves to extremist violence. The trigger for this transgression is often a sense of moral outrage in response to a great foreign or domestic moral violation, namely murder, rape or unjust imprisonment. This moral outrage is the emotional driver for violence, as heard in expressions such as “enough is enough.” The moral outrage is often accompanied by disillusionment with the effectiveness of the social blob, which had been powerless to prevent the moral violation. At this point, many disillusioned blob members, mostly those who are not extensively invested in blob activities, simply fade away in disgust from political activism. On the other hand, a very small set of militants, who are simply too deeply invested in blob activities to simply abandon the activism that has become their life, escalate by voicing their criticisms of blob activities, leaders, and organizations to the point of rejecting the blob itself by leaving militant mosques or blob organizations and their non-violent tactics. A common complaint from these rejectionists is that such activities and their advocates are “just talk, talk, talk...” These rejectionists feel it is their personal duty (the concept of *fard ‘ayn* in this case) to protect their imagined global community (the *ummah* in this case). The loyalty to the blob and especially to local groups of militants mediates these exit, voice and escalation options.<sup>17</sup> Their beliefs have progressed to include the conviction that the West is at war with Islam; local Muslim tyrants are propped by the West; and only violence against the West will expel the West from Muslim lands and allow them to protect the *ummah* and restore justice in the Muslim world.

The rejectionists start to think of themselves as soldiers (‘Soldier of Allah’ or SoA, in this case) protecting their community (the *ummah*). They pursue martial activities, such as practicing martial arts, paramilitary camping on weekends, or playing paintball. However, while thinking of oneself as a soldier (*mujahed*) during a game is part of the game, among rejectionists, this martial self-concept persists beyond the game. The importance of this martial self-concept is that being a soldier defending one’s chosen community legitimizes violence, even against civilians, whom they view as collateral damage in this war. Usually the rejectionists direct their anger at the moral violators, foreign non-Muslim troops fighting in a Muslim country. Their preference is therefore to go and join the neo-jihad abroad as a foreign fighter. In this case, they try to travel to a zone of conflict, such as Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Israel, Iraq, Somalia or Yemen. They

seek military training in places like Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or Lebanon. They are Western wannabe volunteers going abroad looking for terrorist organizations, but they find it difficult to meet them, especially now that an aggressive counterterrorist drone missile campaign targets terrorist leaders, sowing distrust of newcomers among foreign terrorists. This distrust of Western wannabes shows the critical importance of local bridges between these wannabes and terrorist organizations abroad, like Rashid Rauf, for instance. Without these bridges, terrorist organizations will become physically disconnected from their followers in the West.

Attendance at a ‘training camp,’ which is now often a small temporary rented house in the Afghan Pakistani border area, reinforces the wannabe’s martial self-concept. Actual participation in training is more important than any indoctrination, since the teaching is often in pidgin Urdu or English, rendering impossible any attempt at indoctrination. Most wannabes want to fight locally as foreign fighters, but a very few are turned around by terrorist organizations to conduct terrorist activity in their home country, especially if their country is one of the moral violators.<sup>18</sup> In terms of the graphs shown in the timeline survey of global neo-jihadi plots, it is clear that the impulse that generated the first spike in 2004 in the graphs was moral outrage at the allied invasion of Iraq.<sup>19</sup> Returnees from these camps are especially dangerous not only because they have acquired some of the expertise to conduct terrorist operations in the West, but also because they have acquired street credibility and charisma to attract followers among former friends and blob militants in their home country. Once they return, they hit the ground running: the survey showed that over 90% of all returnees either completed their operation or carried out significant acts in furtherance within five months of their return home.

Terrorist plots in the West are usually conducted by a ‘bunch of guys’<sup>20</sup> who were peripheral to demanding blob organizations (in this case, *Hizb ut Tahrir* or *al Muhajiroun*) whose constant proselytism and internal discipline prevented their members from turning to violence. However, the active cores of these bunches of guys were very involved in blob activities, with a high level of centrality within the blob, as shown by a high inbetweenness score. This active core emerges out of offline and online discursive forums. In offline settings such as political meetings, inspirational leaders may play a critical role in this turn to violence. They claim credibility from alleged past involvement in the neo-jihad abroad and inspire with stories of fighting glory young Muslim frustrated with the blob and seeking thrills and adventure. Of course, their audiences are self-selected and they create the opportunity for chance meetings for dedicated wannabes that want to go beyond regular blob activities. Once they discover their common frustration with the limitations of their political activism, these young men share an instant feeling of commonality around their rejection of the blob. They often approach the inspirational leader for linkage to terrorist organizations abroad, but the leader has often exaggerated his past fighting experience and turns out to be just a fabulist, unable to help the young wannabes. Nevertheless, the damage is done as the young militants form the kernel of a conspiracy and leave behind the fabulist.

Rarely do these terrorist conspiracies have a clear-cut leader able to impose his will on passive followers as portrayed in the media. Such a conspiracy usually consists of an active core of two

to four people, egging each other on. They initiate the conspiracy and drive it to its conclusion. There is a continuum of activism within the conspiracy. Most of the conspirators are simply invited to join the plot in progress from a pool of trusted friends or relatives already in the blob. An invitation to participate seems a more apt description of this process of joining than a more formal term like recruitment. These newcomers, who tag along with the active core, can nevertheless be enthusiastic killers, but they would not have initiated the conspiracy themselves or persevered until the end. Besides the active core and the associates who are invited to join the plot in progress are a large number of peripherals, who suspect but may not know the extent of the conspiracy. Nevertheless, they often provide help to their friends with shelter and money. From the evidence at trials, there seems to be a continuum of participation in these terrorist plots and the process is a bottom up process of self-recruitment and self-organization.

Participation in a terrorist plot often comes at a time of transition, when the future conspirators are leaving their family of origin usually to go to school or simply move or migrate to a new place, where they encounter new networks of friends. One characteristic that often distinguishes conspirators from their non-involved friends and family is that they have few structured routine activities. They have no full time career commitments: they are students who dropped out of classes, cab drivers neglecting their work, or peddlers who no longer sell trinkets. Nor do they have full time involvement with demanding blob organizations. They mostly hang out together. If they have married within the blob, their wives often encourage their participation in the blob, which increases their probability of meeting active core conspirators and invitation to participate. If they marry outside the blob, their wives discourage them from hanging out with their former friends, and they often drift away from the blob.

As the plot proceeds, the bunch of guys separates itself from the blob. They feel special and superior to other blob members and believe that they have become of the vanguard of the neo-jihad against the West. The active core shares an increased sense of cohesion and the required secrecy inherent in a conspiracy forces them to prune their emerging conspiratorial network by avoiding friends who are not reliable, either operationally or ideologically. Personality conflicts and competition for leadership also lead to successive splintering within the active core of potential conspiratorial networks. Co-conspirators needed to carry out full scale operations are rapidly invited to join the conspiracy around the end of the plot, often within two or three weeks of its conclusion. Trust of the newcomers trumps their expertise or even social capital for selection into the plot. At the end of the operation, all of the final conspirators just hang out together all the time. There is a dual process of isolation from the blob. Non-involved blob members suspect their former colleagues of plotting something and feel uneasy about their new activities and secrecy. They shun them in order to avoid trouble with the authorities. Conspirators of course stay away from other blob members to preserve the secrecy of their activities.

The Internet is changing the emergence of conspiracies. The semi-anonymity of the Internet allows for greater personal disclosure, which, if reciprocated, leads to a greater sense of

intimacy. The resulting discourse on the Internet may be more open and honest, but also more abusive and extreme than offline discussions. On the Internet, shy individuals, who feel inhibited offline, can drop the inhibitions that prevent their participation in group discussions. The Internet also provides opportunities for individuals holding unpopular views in a hostile environment. They can seek out people holding similar views online with little risk. If they get some positive feedback from their online friends, who validate their beliefs, their online life becomes a more important part of their life and encourages them to become more confident and assertive of their online collective identity. Sharing unpopular beliefs and emotions with like-minded others online hardens their beliefs and makes them more willing to act out according to their beliefs. Social media accentuates this process, as one-on-one chats on social media accounts like Facebook or YouTube, increase this sense of intimacy and commitment. Participants may seem to be alone physically, but they are part of a supportive online community. These online group dynamics encourage awkward individuals in social settings to act out as lone wolves. The gradual rise of social media, starting around 2008, probably explains the second increase in global neo-jihadi terrorist plots in the West as shown in the graphs. It illustrates the increasing prominence of the Leaderless neo-Jihad.

Gradually, there is an escalation in suspicious activities among the plotters. Some become more interested in learning about the legitimacy of killing civilians. Others may show an increased interest in past terrorist activities and download information to learn from them. Plotters discuss ideas or plans about terrorist activities, and some communicate inappropriate interest in potential targets. They often go so far as to case these targets either offline or online, via Google Earth. They raise money for their operations either through personal funds or through fraudulent loans. Terrorist operations are not expensive, and most Western terrorist plots are self-financed. Obtaining the means of destruction, especially chemicals for explosives, is often their most complicated task. This is also the point at which conspirators cross the line into clearly illegal activities. This task often consumes all their efforts, and once finished, makes them vulnerable to discovery by law enforcement authorities since the manufactured bombs are clear evidence of criminal intent. For this reason, they never sit on their bombs, but use them as soon as possible on easy targets of opportunity, usually mass transportation. The difficulty of building bombs is discouraging to Internet mediated lone wolves, which may explain their preference for more conventional weapons, such as firearms or even knives. If the plotters intend to conduct suicide operations, they often have final preparation rituals, including a suicide video and some arrangements to settle their debts to friends. Some single conspirators may choose to get married. At the very end, in order to blend in the crowd, they revert to their secular appearance.

There is no linear path in the turn to political violence. The process is often characterized by fits and starts, and a zigzag pattern of commitment to the conspiracy that fluctuates with foreign and domestic historical contingencies that generate moral outrage and makes the conspiracy salient again in the mind of an active core that might have drifted into complacency during quiescent times. The model is not deterministic, as it is strongly dependent on subtle local chance events,

such as random meaningful connections to other potential conspirators. Indeed, one of the surprises of this research is the ubiquity of difficulties and obstacles in the path of potential conspirators, which makes terrorism a very rare activity. Plotters face a hostile environment personally in terms of family, friends and spouses against violence; culturally in terms of lack of justification for the use of violence against civilians; and political in terms of vigilance from law enforcement agencies. They often lack the social capital to secretly access material necessary for their plot. They also lack the availability to devote their time and effort necessary for the conspiracy because of their commitment to work or family. Therefore, most conspirators give up in the early stages of their plots. However, even of those who continue, many change their minds when facing the consequences of their actions and give up at a very advanced state of planning. In this process, there are some critical turning points: a sense of moral outrage to events, the development of a martial identity, the rejection of blob activities and escalation to violence.

The distinction between the many who boast and brag about violence and the very few who actually commit violence shows the inherent problem in law enforcement sting operations. By providing people who want to turn to violence, but would not have either initiated or driven a plot themselves, with the means of conducting violence without any effort on their part, law enforcement authorities short circuit and eliminate the obstacles in the path of potential terrorists. Without the facilitation of law enforcement authorities, these plots would very rarely have gone to their conclusion. The authorities claim that their sting operations are not entrapment because the defendants had intent. Of course, they did, but intent is not the same thing as actually conducting terrorist operations, which require a strong degree of initiative, sagacity and perseverance to overcome the inevitable obstacles in their path. The defendants in these sting operations often do not display such qualities, suggesting that they would never have proceeded to the conclusion of the conspiracy on their own.

This model based on the richness of the evidence shows that terrorists are not passive infantilized victims, vulnerable, at risk, or brainwashed by recruiters or an ideology. They are active participants in their lives, trying to make sense of their world, constructing meanings from available cultural models, and making choices accordingly. In other words, they are fully responsible for their illegal actions. The turn to political violence in the West is mostly a bottom up process; it might be different elsewhere in the world. This turn to violence is especially dangerous when Western wannabes travel abroad and link up with terrorist organizations. Terrorism is foremost a political activity. Terrorists are not characterized by specific personality characteristics that drive them to commit violence: they are simply people who participate in terrorism for political reasons often out of a sense of moral outrage.

The implication of this model is that political protest social movements (often labeled extremism by supporters of the status quo) should not be confused with terrorism (violence). Certainly, these communities facilitate the turn to violence, but this happens only when they are deemed ineffective in terms of reaching their political goals. Protest political social movements are not always negative. They have often promoted the ideals of liberal democracies and contributed to



their advancement, as did the abolition movement and the labor movement of the nineteenth century, various ethnic autonomous social movements, or the civil rights movement. Each of these peaceful movements had a small violent splinter group associated with it, which provided conservative forces the opportunity to portray the entire social movement as violent. Cracking down on a political protest social movement would promote the turn to political violence, as some of its members would feel a sense of moral outrage, reject its legal activities as ineffective in advancing its goals, and feel a sense of personal obligation to defend its political community against the state. The legitimate focus for law enforcement is not countering legal political protest, but on recognizing the transition from legal activities to illegal political violence.

Unsuccessful political protest social movements will fade away over time as most participants lose interest and leave (exit option). However, as the community shrinks, a very small hard core too invested in the lifestyle and activism to just leave and too frustrated with the ineffectiveness of the social movement may turn to violence if it become morally outraged (escalation option). This implies that the violence comes at the tail end of a political protest social movement. This violence would take the form of disconnected loners or smaller plots and not large violent conspiracies that might have characterized the popularity of the social movement. This is a second argument explaining the emergence of lone wolf terrorists in the graphs. They may indicate that the social movement is fading away.

Political protest social movements fade away when they fail to attract new members, given the inevitability that people will leave. Usually, their ideology and its way of interpreting and understanding world events is displaced by another one, much like new fashions displace old ones. The wave of Middle East uprisings in 2011 is discrediting the old global neo-jihadi ideology, which placed the blame for the inequities in the Middle East on the West for propping up local tyrants. Local tyrants did seek protection from the West by claiming to be the last bulwark against militant Islam and exaggerated its power to justify the harshness of their rule. Non-violent secular pro-democracy movements in Tunisia and Egypt overthrew their respective tyrants in just one month, something that the global neo-jihad had not been able to do in more than two decades of trying. Furthermore, the West sided with these protesters in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria as well as the more violent ones that succeeded in overthrowing local tyrants in Yemen and Libya. These events refuted the global neo-jihadi claims, which have been rendered largely irrelevant by the nationalistic rather than religious nature of the Arab Spring. Young Muslims the world over have joined the ranks of these secular political social movements and are abandoning the global neo-jihadi vulgar political interpretation of Islam. As its leaders are being killed and its ideology fails to appeal to a new generation of Muslims, global neo-jihadi terrorism is rapidly decaying.

## APPENDIX

### Global neo-Jihadi Terrorist Plots in the West since 9/11/01

Paris US Embassy Plot	9/13/2001	AQ
Belgian Kleine Brogel US Air Base Plot	9/13/2001	AQ
Shoe Bomb Plot (Richard Reid)	12/22/2001	AQ
German al-Tawhid Plot	4/1/2002	Tawhid
Heidelberg Plot	9/5/2002	LW
French Chechen Network (Ricin Plot v. Russian Embassy)	12/17/2002	
British Ricin Plot (Earth)	1/5/2003	
Sydney Brigitte/Lodhi Plot	10/9/2003	LeT
Madrid Train Bombings	3/11/2004	
London Fertilizer Bomb Plot (Crevice + Khawaja)	3/30/2004	AQ
Spain AVE Train near Toledo Plot	4/2/2004	
Amsterdam Schiphol Airport Plot (Hofstad)	6/30/2004	
London Plot (Rhyme)	8/2/2004	AQ
New York Herald Square Plot	8/27/2004	Duo
Rotterdam Plot (Yehya Kadouri)	9/27/2004	LW
Madrid Nova Plot	10/20/2004	
Murder of Theo van Gogh	11/2/2004	Loner
Berlin Allawi Assassination Plot	12/3/2004	Tawhid
Dutch Assassination Plot against politicians (Hofstad)	6/22/2005	
JIS Plot, Torrence, California	7/5/2005	
London Bombings (Theseus)	7/7/2005	AQ
London Bombings (Vivace & Overamp)	7/21/2005	AQ
French Ansar al-Fath case (Bourada)	9/26/2005	
Amsterdam Plot v. AIVD HQS (Hofstad)	10/14/2005	
Sarajevo Plot (& Glostrup Plot)	10/20/2005	
Melbourne/Sydney Plot (Pendennis)	11/4/2005	
Toronto Plot (Osage)	6/3/2006	

Koblenz Attempt	7/31/2006	
London Planes Liquid Bomb Plot (Overt)	8/10/2006	AQ
Danish Odense Plot (Vollmose)	9/4/2006	
Oslo Synagogue Plot (Arfan Bhatti)	9/21/2006	LW
Illinois Shopping Mall Shot (Derrick Shareef)	12/6/2006	Duo
Birmingham Kidnap & Beheading Plot (Gamble)	1/31/2007	Duo
Nancy Plot (Kamel Bouchentouf)	5/2/2007	LW
Doctors' Plot (London & Glasgow)	6/30/2007	Duo
Danish Copenhagen Plot (Glasvej -- Dagger Plot)	9/4/2007	AQ
German Sauerland Plot (Alberich)	9/4/2007	IJU
Barcelona Plot	Jan-08	TTP
Bristol Plot (Andrew [Isa] Ibrahim)	Apr-08	LW
Exeter Bomb Plot (Nicky Reilly)	5/22/2008	LW
DCRI Plot (Rany Arnaud)	12/16/2008	LW
Manchester Plot (Pathway: Abid Naseer & al)	4/8/2009	AQ
Sydney Plot (Neath)	8/4/2009	
Denver/NY Plot (Zazi)	9/9/2009	AQ
Milan Plot (Mohd Game)	10/12/2009	Duo
Chicago Danish Cartoon LeT Plot (Headley/Rana)	10/27/2009	AQ
Ft Hood Shooting (Maj Nidal Malik Hasan)	11/5/2009	LW
Underwear Christmas Bomb attempt (Abdulmuttalab)	12/25/2009	AQAP
Danish Cartoonist Attack (Muhidin M Gelle)	1/1/2010	LW
Times Square Bomb Plot (Faisal Shahzad)	5/1/2010	TTP
Stabbing of Steven Timms, MP (Roshanara Chowdhry)	5/16/2010	LW
Oslo Plot (Mikael Davud & al)	7/8/2010	AQ
Copenhagen One Legged Bomber Plot (Lors Doukaev)	9/10/2010	LW
Cargo Plane Bomb Plot (AQAP, Ibrahim al Asiri)	10/29/2010	AQAP
Stockholm Suicide bomber (Taimour Abdulwahab al Abdaly)	12/11/2010	LW
British Christmas Plot 2010	12/20/2010	
Brandbergen Plot v. Cartoonist (Dhahri, Zalouti & al)	12/29/2010	AQ
Texas Saudi bomber (Khalid Ali-Muhammed Aldawsari)	2/23/2011	LW
Frankfort Airport Shooter (Arid Uda)	3/2/2011	LW
Dusseldorf Plot (Abdelakim el-Khebir & al)	4/29/2011	AQ
NY Synagogue Plot (Ferhani & Mamdouh)	5/11/2011	Duo
The Seattle Plot (Abdul-Latif & Mujahidh)	6/23/2011	Duo
Ft Hood Redux (Naser Abdo)	7/27/2011	LW

---

<sup>1</sup> See appendix for list of global neo-jihadi terrorist attacks in the West

<sup>2</sup> For instance, if an investigation was 100% sensitive in detecting terrorists (meaning all true terrorists are detected) but only 99% specific (meaning that in 100 investigation, authorities made one mistake, taking an innocent person as a terrorist, in other words labeling him as a false positive), given the very low base rate, the authorities would have to arrest about 333,333 people for each true terrorists. This would not be acceptable in a liberal democracy. Even if authorities would confine themselves to Muslim in the West, and taking a high estimate of 25 million Muslims in the West, authorities would have to arrest about 12,000 Muslims for each true terrorist. This low base rate presents a very significant challenge to law enforcement authorities in Western liberal democracies.

<sup>3</sup> See *Regina v. Omar Khyam et al*, 2006/2007, Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London, March 21, 2006 to April 30, 2007; *Regina v. Momin Khawaja*, 2005, Superior Court of Justice, Ottawa, Ontario, Bail Hearing, June 6 to 15, 2005; *Regina v. Momin Khawaja*, 2008, Superior court of Justice, Ottawa, Ontario, Indictment No. 04-G30282, June 23 to October 29, 2008

<sup>4</sup> The information on the 7/7/05 London bombing comes from the transcripts of *Regina v. Mohammed Shakil et al*, 2008, Crown Court, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey, Case No: T20087141; the House of Commons official report on the bombings, House of Commons, *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7<sup>th</sup> July 2005*, May 11, 2006, London: The Stationary Office; and the transcripts of the Coroner's Inquests into the London Bombings of 7 July 2005 at <http://7julyinquests.independent.gov.uk/>. The information on the July 21, 2005 attack on the London transportation system comes from the transcripts of the multiple trials connected with the failed bombings: *Regina v. Muktar Said Ibrahim et al*, 2007, Woolwich Crown Court, January 11 to July 11, 2007; *Regina v. Yeshiemebet ('Yeshi') Girma et al*, 2008, Central Criminal Court, Old Bailey, London, February 25 to June 12, 2008; *Regina v. Isamil Abdurahman et al*, 2007/2008, Kingston Crown Court, October 1, 2007 to February 4, 2008; and *Regina v. Mohammed Hamid et al*, 2007/2008, Woolwich Crown Court, October 8, 2007 to February 26, 2008. The information on the trans-Atlantic airplanes liquid bomb plot comes from the transcripts of *R. v. Ahmed Ali et al*, 2008, Woolwich Crown Court, April 3 to September 8, 2008

<sup>5</sup> Raffaello Pantucci, 2010, "Manchester, New York, and Oslo: Three Centrally Directed Al-Qa'ida Plots," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol 3, No 8 (August 2010): 10 - 13

<sup>6</sup> Petter Nesser and Brynjar Lia, 2010, "Lessons Learned from the July 2010 Norwegian Terrorist Plot," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol 3, No 8 (August 2010): 13 - 17

<sup>7</sup> Information on David Coleman Headley comes from the discovery material and transcripts of *U.S. v. Rana et al*, 2011

<sup>8</sup> Information on this plot is derived from Magnus Ranstorp, 2011, "Terrorist Awakening in Sweden?" *CTC Sentinel*, Vol 4, No 1 (January 2011): 1 - 5

<sup>9</sup> See *Ministère Public c/ Wille Brigitte et Sajid Mir*, 2007, Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, 14<sup>eme</sup> chambre/2, No d'affaire: 0031139018, Jugement du: 15 mars 2007

<sup>10</sup> Fernando Reinares, 2010, *A New Composite Global Terrorism Threat to Western Societies from Pakistan? Making Sense of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona (WP)*, Real Instituto Elcano, Madrid, August 2 at [http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\\_eng/Content?WCM\\_GLOBAL\\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\\_in/zonas\\_in/dt28-2010](http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/dt28-2010)

<sup>11</sup> Some analysts have linked the Madrid bombings to al Qaeda through Amer Azizi or the *Groupe Islamique Combatant Marocain*. I have carefully weighted the evidence for such links and even went to the trial of the Madrid bombers. I have reviewed over 100,000 of discovery material and did not find any convincing links to any formal organizations. The investigation of the bombings do not show any foreign link. The judge at the trial concluded that the perpetrators were inspired by al Qaeda but not linked to it.

<sup>12</sup> Marc Sageman, 2008, *Leaderless Jihad*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. At the time, the argument was criticized in an article in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "The Myth of Homegrown Terrorism."

<sup>13</sup> The same confusion applies to the term "violent extremism," which can be either extremist views using violent words and violence based on extreme views. So involvement in a peaceful political protest community may be viewed as violent extremism by authorities and the press, especially if some very small elements of this community have turned to violence.

This confusion of words and deeds also suggests an over-cognitive view of terrorism, implying that they carefully reflect on what to do and then go on and carry out their thoughts. This is rarely the case. Most defendants at terrorist trials are not intellectuals, who carefully weigh the implications of their actions.

---

<sup>14</sup> Pl. of mujahed, one who practices jihad

<sup>15</sup> In Western liberal democracies, arrested individuals have civil rights and undergo a criminal trial, which provides the richest source of information on the defendants and their respective criminal plots.

<sup>16</sup> See Sageman, Marc, 2011, *The Turn to Political Violence in the West*, in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences, Second Edition*, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, LTD: 117-119 for a bibliography of the material analyzed

<sup>17</sup> For an analysis of the exit and voice options see Hirschman, Albert, 1970, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. However, Hirschman seems to have neglected the escalation option. For the latter, see Festinger, Leon; Riecken, Henry & Schachter, Stanley, 1964, *When Prophecy Fails*, New York: Harper Torchbooks

<sup>18</sup> Contrast the hundreds of volunteers that went to Iraq, not counting those that went to Afghanistan, with the no more than three dozen total (counting from the survey) over the whole decade that agreed to return to the West and carry out terrorist operations there.

<sup>19</sup> This is the rationale given by the terrorists themselves, both in terms of those directed by al Qaeda, as in the Crevice case (*R. v. Khyam et al*, 2006/2007) and autonomous groups, like the Madrid bombers, who responded to the online analysis *Iraqi Jihad* posted on the *Global Islamic Media Front* website.

<sup>20</sup> See Sageman, Marc, 2004, *Understanding Terror Networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press